We provide a theory of random intertemporal choice. Choice is random due to unobserved heterogeneity in discounting from the perspective of a modeler. First, we show that the modeler can identify the distribution of discount rates uniquely from random choice.
Introduction
In many economic models of intertemporal choice, agents have discount rates that are heterogeneous across the population. Theoretically, this heterogeneity is useful as it allows the modeler to capture aspects of the data that cannot be explained assuming a standard representative agent model. 1 Empirically, this heterogeneity is realistic and consistent * We would like to thank Taisuke Imai for his excellent RA work on the data analysis. We also want to thank Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester, Yoram Halevy, Yoichiro Higashi, Vijay Krishna, Tomasz Strzalecki, Charlie Sprenger and participants at the D-Day conference at Duke and LA theory bash for their helpful comments.
1 For example, see Krusell and Smith (1998) .
with what is observed in actual choice data. In many cases however, the modeler (an outside observer such as an econometrician) is not privy to all the different factors affecting discount rates across the population. Whenever there is unobserved heterogeneity in discounting, the resulting aggregate choice data from the prospective of the modeler is random.
In this paper, we provide a theory of random intertemporal choice due to unobserved heterogeneity in discounting. Our contributions are threefold. First, we show that the modeler can identify the distribution of discounting in the population uniquely from random choice. Second, we provide axiomatic characterizations of random discounting, including random exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting as special cases. Third, using the data from Halevy (2015) , we test our axioms and find that they are consistent with random exponential discounting. Moreover, while Halevy (2015) finds significant timeinconsistency and non-stationarity in individual choices, we find that the distribution of discount rates is statistically indistinguishable across decision times. This demonstrates how models of random discounting can deliver insights not easily captured by models of individual deterministic choice.
Our general model is random utility maximization model with discounted utilities.
Agents in a population are characterized by a distribution µ of discount functions and a taste utility u. In other words, the only residual unobserved heterogeneity from the perspective of the modeler is due to discounting. 2 The probability that an infinite-period consumption stream f = (f (0), f (1), . . . ) is chosen from a menu F of consumptions streams is the proportion of agents who rank f higher than every other consumption stream in F .
In other words, if we let ρ F (f ) denote this probability, then
where D is the set of discount functions that are decreasing in t, D(0) = 1 and s>t D (s) → 0 as t → ∞. We call this a random discounting model.
Our first main result shows that under a random discounting model, the modeler can 2 We can easily generalize our model to accommodate unobserved tastes as well.
uniquely identify the distribution of discounting in the population. Moreover, this identification can be achieved using only binary choice data. This extends related uniqueness results of random utility representations to our setup with infinite-period consumption streams.
Our second main result is an axiomatic characterization of our model. We introduce three new axioms: Initial Determinism, Time Monotonicity, and Stochastic Impatience.
Initial Determinism requires that choice must be deterministic when all consumption streams differ only at time 0. Time Monotonicity requires that consumption streams that dominate at every time period must be chosen for sure. Stochastic Impatience requires that when a menu consists of early and delayed consumption streams, the early streams must be chosen for sure. We show that these three axioms along with the standard axioms for random utility representations fully characterize the random discounting model.
By adding two new axioms, Stochastic Stationarity and Intertemporal Extremeness,
we characterize a special case of random discounting model, the random exponential discounting. In a random exponential discounting model, every agent in the population is an exponential discounter. In other words, for each D in the support of µ, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Stochastic Stationarity requires that choice probabilities remain unchanged when all consumption streams in a menu are delayed by the same number of time periods. It is exactly the stochastic version of the deterministic stationarity axiom originally proposed by Koopmans (1960) which requires that intertemporal choices are not reversed when consumptions are delayed by the same number of time periods. Our second axiom, Intertemporal
Extremeness is novel and requires that when faced with a consumption stream and two appropriately delayed streams, either the earliest or the latest stream will be chosen for sure. It is the intertemporal analog of Extremeness proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) (see Appendix A for further discussion on this relationship).
By weakening Stochastic Stationarity, we axiomatize a model of random quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In a random quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, every agent in the popula-tion is a quasi-hyperbolic discounter. In other words, for each D in the support of µ, there exist β ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Weak Stochastic Stationarity requires Stochastic Stationarity to hold only for consumption streams that agree at time 0. Analogous to the deterministic quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, random quasi-hyperbolic discounting allows for violations of Stochastic Stationarity when comparing immediate to future consumptions.
Our last main result involves testing our axioms using the data from Halevy (2015) .
Of the axioms for random exponential discounting, the available data allow us to test Stochastic Stationarity, Stochastic Impatience, and Time Monotonicity. We find that all three are not rejected. The fact that Stochastic Stationarity holds is surprising given that Halevy found that around 40% of individuals in the experiment violate deterministic stationarity.
Finally, we elicit the distribution of discount factors. Since in Halevy's experiments, the same subjects were asked questions at two different time periods, we were able to elicit two distributions of discount factors, one for each decision time. We find that the distributions are statistically indistinguishable across decision times. This is remarkable given Halevy's finding that around half of the individuals in the experiment are timeinconsistent and make different choices at the two decision times. These results suggest the potential usefulness of our model in terms of prediction; while individual choice data may be highly inconsistent, a theory of random choice may reveal patterns of choice pattern at the aggregate level that would be useful for inference for the modeler.
We are not the first to find stable discount distributions across decision times. In a large field experiment conducted over two years, Meier and Sprenger (2015) elicited time preferences using incentivized choice experiments. They found that the aggregate distributions of discount factors and the proportion of present-biased individuals are found to be unchanged over the two years. This suggests that our finding on the stability of discount distributions may be robust in other settings as well.
On the theoretical side, the closest papers to ours are Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Lu (2015) . While they do not model intertemporal choice, from a technical perspective, we generalize their results into a richer domain with an infinite-dimensional product space. This extension is necessary in order for us to deal with stochastic choice over the standard domain for intertemporal preferences, i.e., the set of infinite-period consumption streams. Furthermore, our axiomatic characterizations for the random exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models are novel and address issues unique to intertemporal choice.
Using a different primitive, Higashi et al. (2009) also provide a model of random discounting which includes random exponential discounting as a special case. Their primitive consists of an ex-ante menu preference reflecting the agent's anticipation of future uncertainty in discount rates. In contrast, our primitive consists of ex-post random choice. More recently, Higashi et al. (2016) propose a behavioral definition of more or less impatient using their ex-ante menu preference primitive. Pennesi (2015) provides an axiomatization of an intertemporal version of Luce's model.
As in Luce's model, the probability that an agent chooses a consumption stream from a menu of streams is equal to the ratio of the utility of the stream over the sum of the utilities of the streams in the menu, where each utility is evaluated according to exponential discounting. Pennesi (2015) also provides a generalization which accounts for quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) analyze the validity of stochastic choice models in intertemporal and risky choice. They show the possibility of a fundamental problem arising in the standard application of random utility models. Our models are free of their criticism as our random discounting model belongs to the class of what they call random parameter models. 3 In a more recent paper, Apesteguia and Ballester (2016) propose an axiomatic model of stochastic choice in which the collection of utility functions satisfies the single-crossing property.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and provides the main identification result. Section 3 provides the axioms for random dis-counting. Section 4 provides the axioms for the special cases of random exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Section 5 provides our analysis of comparative statics. In Section 6, we test our axioms using the data from Halevy (2015) and show that the discount distribution is stable across decision times. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs are in the appendices.
Model

Primitives and Notation
We consider agents choosing an infinite-period stream of consumption lotteries. Let time be denoted by T := {0, 1, 2, . . . }, that is, the set of all nonnegative integers. Let X be some finite set of prizes. The consumption at each time period is given by a lottery in ∆X.
A consumption stream corresponds to a sequence of consumption lotteries f ∈ (∆X) T . 4
Let H be the set of all possible consumption streams. While the use of lotteries to model consumption allows us to obtain a straightforward characterization, any metric space would also suffice.
Call a menu is a finite set of consumption streams. Let K be the set of all menus of consumption streams. We endow H with the product topology and K with the corresponding Hausdorff metric. 5 Given any menu F ∈ K, we let extF denote the extreme points of F .
Choice data in our model is a random choice rule (RCR) that specifies a choice distribution over consumption streams for every menu F ∈ K. Let ∆H be the set of all measures over consumption streams and endow it with the topology of weak convergence.
Formally, a RCR is a function ρ : K → ∆H such that ρ F (F ) = 1. We use the notation ρ F (f ) to denote the probability that consumption stream f will be chosen in the menu F .
4 While in our primitive, consumption lotteries are independent across time, our results would still hold if we adopted a primitive that allowed for temporal correlations of lotteries and assumed that agents are indifferent to randomization. We could accommodate preference for randomization by adopting a more general model such as a random intertemporal version of Saito (2015) .
5 The product topology corresponds to point-wise convergence in that
The corresponding metric can be defined as d(f, g) := t
, where · is the Euclidian norm in ∆X. Alternatively, using uniform convergence would have resulted in a continuity axiom that would be too weak. Of course, if T is finite, then both notions of convergence agree.
As in standard models of deterministic choice, we allow for indifferences by relaxing the restriction that all choice probabilities are specified. In other words, we allow the RCR to be silent about choice probabilities between indifferent streams in a menu. 6 Let K 0 ⊂ K denote the set of menus without indifferences. Definition (Random Discounting Representation). ρ is said to have a Random Discounting Representation if there exists a probability measure µ on D and a vN-M function u on
Representations
We say that µ is regular if the random utilities of two consumption streams are either always or never equal. In other words, if ties occur, then they occur almost surely. 7
Regular distributions are dense in the set of all distributions. They are a relaxation of the standard restriction in traditional random utility models where utilities are never equal and allows us to handle indifferences. Going forward, we only consider regular µ and call it a discounting distribution. If ρ has a Random Discounting Representation, we say that it is represented by some (µ, u). The following shows that the discounting distribution can be uniquely identified by only looking at binary choices over consumption streams. Theorem 1. Let ρ and τ be represented by (µ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) ρ {f,g} (f ) = τ {f,g} (g) for all f, g ∈ H 6 Formally, indifferences correspond to non-measurability with respect to a σ-algebra H on H. Given any menu F , the corresponding choice distribution ρ F is a measure on the σ-algebra generated by H ∪{F }. Without loss of generality, we let ρ denote the outer measure with respect to this σ-algebra. See Lu (2015) for details.
7 Formally, this means that for all z ∈ [0, 1] T , D · z = 0 occurs with µ-measure zero or one.
(
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
In a Random Discounting Representation, randomness in choice is driven by the stochasticity of discounting. Each choice realization corresponds to a realization of the discount function D ∈ D of an agent in the population. Note that for simplicity, our model assumes that the vN-M utility u is the same across agents. In other words, the only unobserved heterogeneity is due to discounting. This can be easily generalized so that u is random as well, in which case, we would obtain a more general representation that is characterized by a joint distribution over both discount functions and vN-M utilities.
While we have focused on the population interpretation of this random utility model, one could alternatively use our model to describe the random choice of a single agent choosing consumption streams repeatedly over time. In this case, the richness of our model even allows us to accommodate learning by the agent. For example, suppose
] where δ (t) is the actual discount factor at time t ∈ T . In this case, the model describes an agent who learns about future discount factors from the realization of the current discount factor δ (t). If δ corresponds to interest rates for instance, then the agent updates about future interest rates given today's interest rate.
Two natural special cases of the representation are the following.
(1) exponential if and only if µ-a.s. for each t ∈ T D(t) = δ t for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
(2) quasi hyperbolic if and only if µ-a.s. for each t > 0
for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1].
Axioms for Random Discounting
We now introduce the axioms for our model. The first set of axioms are standard.
Axiom (Linearity). For any F ∈ K, g ∈ H, and a ∈ (0, 1),
Axiom (Extremeness). For any F ∈ K, ρ F (extF ) = 1.
Axiom (Nondegeneracy). ρ F (f ) < 1 for some F and f ∈ F .
In our paper, the only residual unobserved heterogeneity from the perspective of the modeler is due to discounting. If the consumption streams are different only at period 0, then the choices over such consumption streams must be deterministic. This requirement is formalized by the following axiom.
Axiom (Initial Determinism). For any F ∈ K and any f, g ∈ F , if f (t) = g(t) for all
We now introduce some useful notation. Given any two consumption streams f and g and time period t ∈ T , define the spliced consumption stream f tg such that
Thus, f tg is the consumption stream that is f up to period t − 1 and then restarts with g from t onwards. In other words,
For F = {f 1 , . . . , f k } and G = {g 1 , . . . , g k }, we can also define the spliced menu
Note that the notation F tG is well-defined if either F or G are singletons. Also note that the sequence of menus F tg converges to the menu F as t → ∞ under the product topology. By the Continuity axiom, ρ F tg → ρ F . In other words, only consumptions in finite time matter.
For any lottery p ∈ ∆X, we let p ∈ H denote the constant consumption stream that yields p every period. Given Initial Determinism and the fact that the set of prizes is finite, we can pin down preferences using time 0 choice data and find a worst consumption stream w ∈ H where w is a constant consumption stream and for all f, g ∈ F ,
Lemma 2 in the Appendix shows that given the standard axioms, the worst consumption stream is well-defined. We can now define our next axiom.
Time Monotonicity says that if the consumption at every time period of a stream is the best in a menu, then that stream must be chosen for sure. It is the natural temporal analog of standard monotonicity axioms.
Finally, we define delayed consumptions. For any f ∈ H and t ∈ T , let f t := wtf .
Hence, f t is a consumption stream that consists of f delayed by t and with w at the beginning. In other words,
Stochastic Impatience below states that earlier streams are always chosen over delayed ones.
Axiom (Stochastic Impatience). For any f ∈ H and t ∈ T , ρ {f,f t } (f ) = 1
We are now ready to state our general representation theorem.
Theorem 2. ρ has a Random Discounting Representation if and only if it satisfies Monotonicity, Linearity, Extremeness, Continuity, Nondegeneracy, Initial Determinism, Time
Monotonicity and Stochastic Impatience.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of two steps. First, we use the standard arguments to obtain a representation for menus that consist of streams that yield non-worst consumptions only in a finite number of time periods. We then use Kolmogorov's Extension theorem and Continuity to obtain the representation for all menus.
Random Exponential and Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
In order to characterize the random exponential discounting model, we need two more axioms. For any F ∈ K and t ∈ T , define F t =: f ∈F f t .
Axiom (Stochastic Stationarity). For any f ∈ H and t ∈ T ,
This is the random choice version of the deterministic stationarity axiom as proposed by Koopmans (1960) . However, we need something more for characterizing a representation of random exponential discounting (see example below). First, define a forward consumption
To understand Intertemporal Extremeness, note that there are two aspects to intertemporal choices: the level of consumption and the timing of consumption. The condition
imply that there is a trade-off between these two aspects when an agent is choosing between g and h (or f and g). By choosing g over h (or f over g), the agent consumes one period earlier but his level of consumption decreases due to the mixing with the worst outcome. In this sense, one can think of f and h as the extreme choices; f is the best in terms of consumption timing but worst in terms of consumption level while h is the best in terms of consumption level but worst in terms of consumption timing. Stream g is in between f and h and is the intermediary choice.
Intertemporal Extremeness states that g will never be chosen.
Technically, Intertemporal Extremeness is the intertemporal analog of the extremeness axiom proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) . In other words, just like how linearity by itself is insufficient and requires extremeness for a random expected utility representation, stationarity by itself is insufficient and requires intertemporal extremeness for a random exponential representation (see Appendix A for a precise statement of this relationship). Proof. See Appendix B.3.
We now provide an example of random discounting representation that satisfies Stochastic Stationarity but is not exponential. Such an example would clarify the importance of
In other words, D ω = 1, exp(− The formal proof is in the Appendix. Here, we provide the sketch as to why µ satisfies
that this equivalence is captured in Figure 4 .1 by the fact that the slope of log D ω is the same between periods from 0 to 1 and periods from 3 to 4, for example. Therefore, when t is even, each realization D ω predicts no violation of the deterministic stationarity axiom.
Note that this equivalence is captured in Figure 4 .1 by the fact that the slope of log D 1 between periods from 0 to 1 is the same as the slope of log D 0 between periods from 1 to 2, for example.
Therefore when t is odd, D ω predicts a violation of the deterministic stationarity axiom if and only if D 1−ω predicts the opposite direction of the violation. The two reversals cancel each other out and "on average" Stationarity is satisfied, which implies that Stochastic Stationarity is satisfied.
For the random quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, we need to weaken Stochastic Stationarity. In particular, suppose that Stochastic Stationarity holds only for the menus in which all consumptions at time 0 are the same.
Axiom (Weak Stochastic Stationarity). For any F ∈ K and t ∈ T , if f (0) = g(0) for any
The deterministic version of this axiom has appeared in Hayashi (2003) and Olea and Strzalecki (2014) . In our model, Weak Stochastic Stationarity along with Intertemporal
Extremeness exactly characterize random quasit-hyperbolic discounting. Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Comparative Statics
We now present some comparative statics for our random discounting model. First, consider two RCRs ρ and τ with worst consumption streams w ρ and w τ respectively. A consumption stream f is one-shot under ρ if f (t) = w ρ for all t > 0 and ρ {wρ,f } (w ρ ) = 0.
In other words, f gives the ρ-worst payoff for all future time periods and something strictly better than the ρ-worst payoff initially. We say one RCR is stochastically more patient than another if the probability that the first chooses a delayed one-shot consumption stream is always greater than the second.
Definition. ρ is stochastically more patient than τ if for any f and g that are one-shot under ρ and τ respectively, s > t and a ∈ [0, 1], ρ f s , af(FOSD) its distribution under ν. This exactly captures the ordering of distributions of discount factors according to the level of patience. We now have the following result.
Proposition 2. Let ρ and τ be represented by (µ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. Then µ ν if and only if ρ is stochastically more patient than τ .
Proof. Consider the constant consumption streams r, p ∈ H and let f = r1w ρ and g = p1w τ . Now, for s > t,
where the last line follows from the fact u(r) > 0 and
Note that this immediately implies the following result that allows the modeler to compare FOSD of exponential discounting distributions using random choice.
Corollary 1. Let ρ and τ be represented by (µ, u) and (ν, v) respectively where both µ and ν are exponential. Then µ FOSD ν if and only if ρ is stochastically more patient than τ .
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 2 above.
Testing the Axioms
In this section, we report the empirical results from testing our axioms using the data from Halevy (2015) . Our main finding is that the axioms for random exponential discounting are not rejected. Moreover, since we have choice data from the same population of subjects at two different time periods, we can elicit the distribution of discount factors at each time period. Surprisingly, we find that they are statistically indistinguishable across the two decision times.
In the experiments of Halevy (2015) , subjects are asked to choose between a sooner but smaller consumption and a later but larger consumption at two different time periods (i.e., week 0, week 4). In the questions, the payoffs and consumption times vary as follows: Halevy also repeated the same questions but with all payments scaled up (e.g. the smaller payoff is $100 instead of $10). We also performed the same analysis using the data from these additional questions. Our results do not change (see Appendix C).
Note that the difference between Questions 1 and 2 is that the consumptions in the latter are delayed by exactly four weeks. Hence, the deterministic stationarity axiom would imply that a subject would choose the sooner but smaller consumption in Question 1 if and only if he chooses the sooner but smaller consumption in Question 2. Halevy (2015) found that about 40% of the subjects violate the deterministic stationarity axiom.
Note also that the consumptions in Questions 2 and 3 are the same both in terms of the size of the prizes and the time period in which they are realized. They are different only in terms of the decision time of the subjects. A subject is time consistent if he does not reverse his choices between the two decision times. Halevy (2015) found that about half of the subjects exhibit time inconsistency.
Halevy (2015) called the above set of experiments "Wave 1". He also conducted the same experiment using different subjects at different times in a second set of experiments which he called "Wave 2". In total, 130 subjects participated in all the experiments. Among these subjects, 10 had multiple switching points. As in Halevy (2015) , we exclude them from our analysis.
For each Wave and Question, we test whether the random choice induced by the subjects satisfy the axioms we proposed. In particular, we focus on Stochastic Stationarity, Stochastic Impatience, and Time Monotonicity since given Halevy's data, these were the only axioms we could test. As a robustness check, we also performed the same analysis using the combined data from Waves 1 and 2. Our results do not change (see Appendix C for details).
Stochastic Stationarity requires consistency between Questions between 1 and 2 as follows. To simplify notation, let ρ(x, y) denote ρ {x,y} (x). In Questions 1 and 2, Stochastic Stationarity requires that for any x ∈ {9.9, . . . , 10.9}, We statistically test (6.1) for Waves 1 and 2, and it is not rejected at the 10% significance level in both Waves for all values of x (see Appendix C for p-values). This result is surprising given that at the individual level, Halevy (2015) finds that 40% of the subjects violate the deterministic stationarity axiom. Halevy (2015) does find that the means of aggregated choices satisfy deterministic stationarity, and while this is consistent with our results, our findings are stronger in that they are not implied by his results.
Stochastic Impatience requires the following conditions on the choice data: In other words, subjects should all prefer earlier to later prizes. We find that (6.2) is not In summary, the three axioms that we set out to test, Stochastic Stationarity, Stochastic
Impatience, and Time Monotonicity, are all not rejected at the 10% significance level. Next, we elicit the distribution of discount factors µ using the data. We assume risk neutrality Following this methodology, we elicit the distribution µ according to the week when the experiment was conducted (i.e., weeks 0 and 4 in Wave 1; weeks 1 and 5 in Wave 2).
For each Wave, we test whether the distributions are statistically indistinguishable across decision times. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we test the following hypotheses separately at the 10% significance level: This last finding is of interest especially given Halevy's result that about the half of the subjects exhibit time inconsistency. In other words, there is a high degree of preference reversals between the two decision times at the individual level, but when we look at random choice at the aggregate level, this inconsistency disappears. A priori, there is no reason why the aggregated random choice data should satisfy (6.4). This demonstrates how models of random discounting can deliver insights not easily captured by models of individual deterministic choice. It also illustrates potential applications of random choice models in terms of prediction. For instance, while individual choice data may be highly inconsistent, a theory of random choice may reveal patterns of choice at the aggregate level that would be useful for inference for the modeler.
One may wonder whether our findings are consistent with half the subjects in the population being exponential discounters while the remaining being present or futurebiased. While this is technically possible, in order to satisfy Stochastic Stationarity, it would require that the fraction of present-biased subjects be exactly equal to the fraction of future-biased subjects. Moreover, it would also mean that the magnitudes of present and future-biasedness are such that they cancel each other out exactly. While unlikely, this could be possible if there was symmetric noise around discount factors in the population.
Note that this is exactly the example we consider in Proposition 1. Hence, testing for
Intertemporal Extremeness would allow us to unequivocally determine if all subjects are exponential discounters or not.
A Appendix: Intertemporal Extremeness
In this section, we argue that Intertemporal Extremeness plays an analogous role as Extremeness in the random expected utility model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) . Let X be a finite set and ∆X be the set of lotteries over X. Let C and C be finite sets of lotteries.
We say C is a translate of C if and only if C = C + (p − q) for some p ∈ C and q ∈ C . 8
First, note that in the lottery setup, Stochastic Stationarity is equivalent to Linearity * , a weaker condition than Linearity.
Axiom (Linearity * ). ρ C (f ) = ρ C (f ) if C and f are translates of C and f respectively.
Clearly, Linearity implies Linearity * . There are random non-expected utility representations that yield random choice rules that satisfy Linearity * but not Extremeness. We now describe one such example. Let X = {x, y} so we can associate each lottery with a point p ∈ [0, 1]. Let ω be uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and let
Consider a random utility that puts 1 2 weight on u ω and 1 2 weight on v ω . To show that this violates Extremeness, let C = 0, 1 2 , 1 . Since the mixed lottery 1 2 is never chosen in C under u ω , we have that
To show that this satisfies Linearity * , suppose C = {p 1 , . . . , p k } with p 1 < p 2 < · · · < p k . Now, for each p i such that 1 < i < k, we have
8 More explicitly, there exists p ∈ C and q ∈ C such that C = {r + p − q | r ∈ C }.
which is unchanged if we translate C. For p 1 , we have
which is again unchanged if we translate C. By symmetric argument, the same holds for p k as well, so Linearity * is satisfied, but this is clearly not a random expected utility model.
By imposing Extremeness however, we are able to obtain a random expected utility representation.
Proposition 3. Let ρ be represented by µ. Then µ is expected utility if and only if ρ satisfies Linearity * and Extremeness
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
In other words, Extremeness provides the additional restrictions to ensure that the random utilities are linear. By analogy, Intertemporal Extremeness plays the same role in our model and is hence aptly named.
B Appendix: Proofs
Recall that T = {0, 1, . . . , ∞}. In the following, we will write ρ (f, g) to denote ρ {f,g} (f ) for any f, g ∈ H. For every D ∈ [0, 1] T , f ∈ H, and vN-M utility function u on ∆X, we use the condensed notation
whenever the limit is well-defined, which may be infinite. Note that this converges for all D ∈ D since s>t D (s) → 0 as t → ∞ and u is bounded since X is finite. Given consumption streams f, g ∈ H and t ∈ T , recall the spliced consumption stream
When F = {f 1 , . . . , f k } and G = {g 1 , . . . , g k }, F tG denotes the spliced menu. Note that this is also well-defined if either F or G is a singleton menu. Finally, recall that for any p ∈ ∆X, we also let p ∈ H denote the constant consumption stream that yields p every period.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let ρ and τ be represented by (µ, u) and (ν, v) respectively. Note that if part (3) is true,
= 1 iff f and g are tied, both RCRs have the same ties so ρ = τ and part (2) is true. Since part (2) implies part (1) trivially, we have that (3) implies (2) implies (1).
Hence, all that remains is to prove that part (1) implies part (3). Suppose (1) is true so ρ {f,g} (f ) = τ {f,g} (g) for all f, g ∈ H. First, note that for any p, q, r ∈ ∆X,
, so u = αv + β for some α > 0. Without loss of generality, we can let u = v and w ∈ ∆X be the worst stream for both ρ and τ .
Fix some finite J ⊂ T and let f ∈ H be such that f (t) = w for all t ∈ J. Let p ∈ ∆X such that u (p) = v (p) = a ∈ [0, 1] and note that
Since this is true for all a ∈ [0, 1] and such f , it must be that the distribution of t∈J D (t) z (t) for all z ∈ [0, 1] J must be the same under µ and ν. Note we can eas-Theorem, µ = ν. This proves (3).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
B.2.1 Worst Consumption Stream is Well-Defined
We first prove that the worst consumption stream w is well-defined. First, we prove a technical lemma showing that under linearity, we can show the following.
Lemma 1. If ρ satisfies Linearity, then ρ (p1f, q1f ) = ρ (p1g, q1g) for all p, q ∈ ∆X and f, g ∈ H.
Proof. Let r := 1 2 p + 1 2 q and note that
By Linearity, this implies that
as desired.
We can now show that the worst consumption stream w ∈ H is well-defined.
Lemma 2. Suppose ρ satisfies Monotonicity, Linearity, Extremeness, Continuity and Initial Determinism. Then there exists a constant consumption stream w ∈ H such that ρ (f 1g, w1g) = 1 for all f, g ∈ H.
Proof. Fix some consumption lottery r ∈ ∆X. Consider the random choice rule τ on ∆X such that for any finite set of lotteries C ⊂ ∆X and p ∈ C,
Note that by Initial Determinism, τ is deterministic. Hence, from Lu (2015) , τ can be represented by a deterministic expected utility u on ∆X. Let w ∈ ∆X be some worst lottery according to u. Note that w exists as X is finite. Let w ∈ H denote the constant consumption stream that yields w every period. From Lemma 1, this implies that for any f, g ∈ H, ρ (f 1g, w1g) = ρ (f 1r, w1r) = τ (f (0) , w) = 1, as desired.
B.2.2 Sufficiency
In order to prove that a Random Discounting Representation exists, we first prove it exists for a subset of menus. For each finite J ⊂ T such that 0 ∈ J, let H J be the subset of menus such that f (t) = w for all t ∈ J, where the existence of w follows from Lemma 2. Let K J ⊂ K be the subset of menus that only contain streams in H J . Hence, we can define a RCR ρ J on K J such that for all F ∈ K J and f ∈ F ,
By the same argument as in Lu (2015) , for every finite J, we can find a measure ν J on ∆J and a vN-M utility u on ∆X such that for every
Note that Initial Determinism and Time Monotonicity imply that this u is fixed and independent of J. We normalize u : ∆X → [0, 1] such that u (w) = 0. Choose f ∈ H such that u (f (t)) = 1 for some t ∈ T and f (s) = w for all s = t. Then by Stochastic Impatience, for any J such that {t, t + 1} ⊂ J, we have
Hence, p is decreasing ν J -a.s. for all finite J where 0 ∈ J. For any J ⊂ T such that 0 ∈ J,
We now extend this representation from any finite J to all of T by using Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem. Hence, we need to check for the following consistency condition. Let
In other words, for all z ∈ [0, 1] S , the distribution of D · z under µ S is the same as that under µ J . As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can easily extend this for all z ∈ R S + so by Cramer-Wold, it must be that µ S is exactly the projection of µ J on D S . Formally, if we
Hence, from Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem, we know there exists a measure µ on D T such that for any finite J ⊂ T and
We now need to generalize the representation for all F ∈ K. First, for every f ∈ F ∈ K and finite t ∈ T , define the following two sets of maximizing discount functions
Proof. We first show that if the premise holds, then ρ F (f ) ≤ µ (N (f, F ) ). In order to
show this, we prove that lim sup t 1 F ) (D) = 1 so for any t ∈ T , we can find some t > t where
Since F tw → F , by Continuity, this implies that
Before completing the proof of part (1), we will now prove part (2). Fix f, g ∈ F and note that if f and g are tied, then from equation (B.1), we have 1
Now, suppose f and g are not tied. Let r ∈ ∆X be such that u (r) = 1. By linearity, we can assume without loss of generality that
Consider a sequence of menus F ε i as ε i → 0. Suppose there are three menus F ε i , F ε j , and F ε k in this sequence that are not in K 0 . Since f and g are not tied, we can assume without loss of generality that h ε j and h ε k are both tied with f (the case for both tied with g is symmetric). Hence, h ε j and h ε k must be tied, so h ε j and 1 2 f + 1 2 g must be tied. By Linearity, this implies that r1w is tied with w, contradicting the representation from above. Hence, there cannot be more than two menus in this sequence that are not in K 0 . So we can always remove menus F ε i that are not in K 0 . Hence, we can assume that F ε i ∈ K 0 for all i without loss of generality. By Continuity, we thus have that
This proves part (2) of the lemma.
We now return to the proof of part (1). Suppose that the inequality in equation (B.1) is strict for some f ∈ F . Let F * ⊂ F be the subset of streams in F that are not tied. If we sum over all the non-tied streams F * , then
where the last inequality follows from part (2) as F * contains no ties. Since this cannot be true, it must be that ρ F (f ) = µ (N (f, F ) ) for all f ∈ F . This completes the proof for the lemma.
We now complete the sufficiency proof. Let r ∈ ∆X such that u (r) = 1 and note that wtr → w as t → ∞. Now, for every D ∈ D T ,
is well-defined, which may be infinite. Hence, by part (1) of Lemma 3 and Continuity,
S is decreasing in t, lim t→∞ S t is well-defined, although it could be infinite. Moreover, if
Since D is decreasing µ-a.s. follows trivially from Stochastic Impatience, µ (D) = 1. Hence, by part (1) of Lemma 3, we have for all F ∈ K and f ∈ F ,
Moreover, the regularity of µ follows from part (2) of Lemma 3. We thus have a Random Discounting Representation as desired.
B.2.3 Necessity
We now prove necessity of the axioms under a Random Discounting Representation. Note that Monotonicity, Linearity, Extremeness and Non-degeneracy follows by similar argument as in Lu (2015) . To see Initial Determinism, note that if f (t) = g (t) for all t > 0 and
To see Stochastic Impatience, note that
Finally, we prove Continuity. Let F k → F where F k , F ∈ K 0 . Note that for any f, g ∈ F k , f and g are not tied. Since µ is regular, this implies that
with µ-measure zero. Now, define
as the set of all discount functions that rank some f, g ∈ F k ∪ F as the same. Note that µ (I) = 0 so if we let D * := D\I, then µ (D * ) = 1. Let µ * be the restriction of µ on D * .
We will now define random variables ξ k : D * → H and ξ : D * → H that have distributions
and define ξ similarly for F . Note that these are well-defined because there exists a unique maximizer f for D ∈ D * . For any measurable set E ⊂ H,
which is measurable. Hence, ξ k and ξ are random variables. Note that
so ρ F k and ρ F are the distributions of ξ k and ξ respectively. Note that for any D ∈ D * ⊂ D,
is bounded and thus continuous in f . Hence, by the Maximum Theorem,
s. and since a.s.
convergence implies convergence in distribution, ρ F k → ρ F as desired.
B.3 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
We will now prove Theorems 3 and 4. We will prove them in reverse order as Theorem 3 follows easily from Theorem 4. To begin, we first show the following lemma Lemma 4. Let ρ be represented by (µ, u).
(1) If ρ satisfies Weak Stochastic Stationarity, then for all
Proof. Suppose ρ is represented by (µ, u). Let r ∈ ∆X be such that u (r) = 1. We prove the two cases separately.
(1) First, suppose ρ satisfies Weak Stochastic Stationarity. Let f ∈ H be such that f (1) = r and f (s) = w for all s = 1. Now, by Weak Stochastic Stationar-
(2) Now, suppose ρ satisfies Stochastic Stationarity. If we let h ∈ H be such that h (0) = r and h (s) = w for all s > 0, then by the same argument as above we
D (0) = 1, the result follows.
B.3.1 Sufficiency of Theorem 4
We first prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 4. Suppose ρ is represented by (µ, u). Since ρ satisfies Weak Stochastic Stationarity, from Lemma 4 and the fact that µ is regular, we know that for all t ≥ 1,
By this result, it suffices to consider the following two cases. (0)) for all g ∈ F }, so µ is trivially quasi-hyperbolic with β = 0.
Choose r ∈ ∆X such that u(r) = 1. Define h ∈ H such that h (2) = r, and h (s) = w for all s = 2. Also, for any a > 0, define f a , g a ∈ H such that g a = ah −1 + (1 − a) w and f a = ag −1 a + (1 − a) w. Hence, we can write down the utility streams for f a , g a , h as follows:
Moreover, for any t ∈ T , the utility streams for the t-delayed streams f t a , g t a , h t are as follows:
Let F t a := f t a , g t a , h t . We now consider two cases. Subcase 2.1: Suppose there exists some a > 0 such that g 1 a is tied with either f 1 a or h 1 . Consider the case in which g 1 a is tied with h 1 . Hence, ρ g 1
a and δ = a, then for all t > 0, we have µ-a.s.
so µ is quasi-hyperbolic as desired. The case for g 1 a is tied with f 1 a is symmetric. Subcase 2.2: Now consider the second case where g 1 a is not tied with f 1 a nor h 1 for all a > 0. Note that by Weak Stochastic Stationarity, this implies that for all t ≥ 1, g t a is not tied with f t a nor h t . Since F t a contains no ties, by Intertemporal Extremeness,
where we define
Since this is true for all a > 0, it must be that µ-a.s. for all t ≥ 1,
In other words, Intertemporal Extremeness implies that the discount ratios are increasing µ-a.s..
For the final step, note that f t+1 a , g t+1 a = a g t a , h t + (1 − a) w. Hence, by Weak Stochastic Stationarity and Linearity ρ f t a , g t a = ρ f t+1 a , g t+1
Finally, by the inclusion-exclusion principle 10 , we have
where the third and fourth equalities hold because g t a is not tied with f t a nor h t . Therefore, by (B.3), we have that
Since this holds for any a > 0, it must be that for all t ≥ 1,
, then for all t > 0,
. Hence, µ is quasi-hyperbolic as desired.
B.3.2 Sufficiency of Theorem 3
Now, suppose ρ satisfies Stochastic Stationary and Intertemporal Extremeness. From
Lemma 4, we know that D (t) > 0 µ-a.s. for all t ∈ T . As in the sufficiency proof for 10 For any two events A and B, P (A ∩ B) = P (A) + P (B) − P (A ∪ B).
Theorem 4, define the streams h, g a , f a and h t , g t a , f t a such that for D ∈ D,
Again we consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose there exists some a > 0 such that g a is tied with either f a or h. Consider the case in which g a is tied with h. Hence, ρ (g a , h) = 1 = ρ (h, g a ). By Stochastic Stationarity, for all t ≥ −1, ρ g t a , h t = 1 = ρ h t , g t a . Hence, for all t ∈ T
If we let δ = a, then for all t ∈ T , we have µ-a.s.
so µ is exponential as desired. As before, the case for g a is tied with f a is symmetric.
Case 2: Now consider the second case where g a is not tied with f a nor h for all a > 0.
By Stochastic Stationarity, this implies that for all t ∈ T , g t a is not tied with f t a nor h t . Let 
. Since this holds for any a > 0, it must be that for all t ∈ T ,
µ-a.s.. If we let δ = D (1), then for all t ∈ T , D (t) = D (1) t = δ t µ-a.s.. Hence, µ is exponential as desired.
B.3.3 Necessity of Theorem 4
We now prove that if µ is quasi-hyperbolic, then ρ must satisfy Intertemporal Extremeness and Weak Stochastic Stationary. We first show Intertemporal Extremeness. Choose any f, g, h ∈ H and a ∈ [0, 1] such that f = ag −1 + (1 − a) w and g = ah −1 + (1 − a) w. Hence, the utility streams for f, g, h are
Note that if g is tied with either f or h, then ρ F ({f, h}) = 1 trivially.
Hence, assume g is not tied with f nor h. Now, note that since µ is quasi-hyperbolic,
as µ is regular and g is not tied with f . Hence, Intertemporal Extremeness is satisfied.
We now prove Weak Stochastic Stationarity. Suppose for all f, g ∈ F , f (0) = g (0).
Consider the case in which d is even and
(B.5)
Let I be a uniform distribution over [0, 1] . Then for any F ⊂ H and f ∈ F ,
Finally, we show that µ violates Intertemporal Extremeness. Fix r ∈ ∆X such that u (r) = 1 > 0 = u (w). Define h ∈ H such that h (2) = r, and h (t) = w for all t ∈ T such that t = 2. Fix a ∈ (0, 1). Define f, g ∈ H by f = ag −1 + (1 − a) w and
Note that exp(− 
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We show that Linearity * and Extremeness imply Linearity. The rest follows from Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) . Let C = aC + (1 − a) r for some r ∈ ∆X and a ∈ (0, 1).
By Extremeness, we can only consider the extreme set of points of C without loss of generality. Suppose C has k extreme points. Hence, we can translate C k-times such that each translated C i overlaps with an extreme point p i ∈ C and conv (C i ) ⊂ conv (C). Now,
Note that ext (E) = C. By Extremeness, we know that ρ E (C) = 1. By Monotonicity, we
for all p i ∈ C. Since p i are also the extreme points of E, by Extremeness, we also have
Monotonicity again, we have that for each i,
as C i ⊂ E for all i. If we let p i = ap i + (1 − a) r ∈ C , then by Linearity * , we have
for all p i ∈ C. Since this is true for all i, and by Extremeness again i ρ C (p i ) = 1, it must be that ρ C (p i ) = ρ C (p i ) for all i. Hence, Linearity is satisfied as desired.
C Appendix: Details of Empirical Tests
In this section, we report the detailed results of our empirical tests. The tests are based on the data from Halevy (2015) , which is available from the journal website. We use the data from his main experiments (not the robustness treatments). As mentioned, 130 subjects completed the experiments, and among them, 10 had multiple switching points.
As in Halevy (2015) , we exclude these 10 subjects from our analysis. In addition to the 10 subjects, Halevy (2015) also excluded 3 subjects who chose all later rewards implying strict non-impatience. As excluding them would render our test of Stochastic Impatience trivial, we keep them in our data set.
As mentioned in the main text, Halevy also asked questions in which all payoffs were scaled up (e.g. the smaller payoff was $100 instead of $10). We also performed our analysis on the data from these questions as well and our main results do not change. These results are also reported in what follows.
As a robustness check, we did all tests by combining the dataset from Wave 1 and Wave 2. The power of the tests is stronger because of the larger number of choices. All results of the tests did not change.
The first and second tables report p-values for the tests using data from Waves 1 and 2 respectively. The third tables report p-values for the tests using the combined data from Waves 1 and 2. In the last two tables, we reports p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests by using data from Waves 1, and Wave 2, and the combined data from Wave 1 and 2 respectively. All p-values are larger than 10%. As a result, all tests are not rejected at the 10% significance level. Table 4 : p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: µ t denotes the distribution of discount factors elicited from the experiments conducted at week t ∈ {0, 1, 4, 5} where the smaller payoff is $10. µ t denotes the distribution of discount factors elicited from the experiments conducted at week t ∈ {0, 1, 4, 5} where the smaller payoff is $100.
µ 0,1 = µ 4,5 0.3789 µ 0,1 = µ 4,5 0.5352 Table 5 : p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov for the combined dataset from Wave 1 and 2: µ 0,1 denotes the distribution of discount factors elicited from the experiments conducted at week 0 and 1, where the smaller payoff is $10. µ 4,5 denotes the distribution of discount factors elicited from the experiments conducted at week 4 and 5, where the smaller payoff is $10. µ 0,1 denotes the distribution of discount factors elicited from the experiments conducted at week 0 and 1, where the smaller payoff is $100. µ 4,5 denotes the distribution of discount factors elicited from the experiments conducted at week 4 and 5, where the smaller payoff is $100.
